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Introduction 
Local councillors play an integral role in the democratic process. Other than 
nationally elected members of parliament, councils remain in many states the only 
collective body subject to universal, democratic elections, and exist as a voter’s most 
immediate link to governing power. Functions carried out by councillors, and the role 
they play within communities and local government, are thus essential to strong, 
localised democracy, despite claims that councillors are ‘amateurish’ or local politics 
incidental to an ever-globalising world (see John 2004; Stone 2005; Trounstine 2009). 
Indeed, such criticisms habitually ignore the intertwined elements of local, national 
and international decision-making (Swyngedouw 1997; Sellers 2002; Stoker 2011), 
and in turn the crucial role councillors play in ensuring citizens and local interests 
remain represented therein. Without councillors, democracy overall would find itself 
drastically weakened, and the gulf between citizen and power widened. Local 
councillors thus provide a first port of call for citizens to have a say in the running of 
their towns, cities and communities where their voice would be lessened if national 
legislatures were the only forum of representation. 
With the fundamental function local councillors serve, understanding the various 
roles of the councillor is perhaps more important than ever. How they represent 
citizens and local interests, how they formulate and scrutinise policy, the work they 
conduct in their localities and councils, the institutional factors which impact their 
authority and how other political forces shape and influence their behaviour can all be 
considered now to be pressing questions for social scientists and politicians alike. Yet 
research into local councillors remains minimal, with little outside of role perceptions 
(de Groot et al. 2010; Karlsson 2012; Verhelst et al. 2013a), councillor and ward 
demographic studies (Improvement and Development Agency 2010; Thrasher et al. 
2014; Kerley and McGarvey 2017) and local government reform critiques to build 
from. We therefore aim here to provide a broad overview of the role and work of local 
councillors, and some of the political, individual and institutional determinants 
thereof. 
This chapter has five sections. with the first covers the basic roles a councillor 
must fulfil, focussing primarily on responsibilities of representation and scrutiny, and 
discuss briefly the professionalisation of the position in recent decades. Second, the 
specific councillor duties in public, in office and in the party. Building from the first 
two sections, section three will then delve into the factors which impact councillor 
workloads, such as electorate-councillor ratio, individual autonomy and political 
context. Section four will examine the higher institutional and political forces which 
shape councillor roles and responsibilities, and the authority and influence ultimately 
wielded thereby. Finally, we review some recommendations for study and the future 
of the field overall. 
The fundamental role of the councillor 
Over time and across space, what it means to be a ‘local councillor’ can vary 
substantially. Councillors’ authority, how they campaign, how they perceive 
themselves, the ways in which they fulfil certain responsibilities, the influence they 
have, the amount of time dedicated to council work and how they are incentivised can 
all be quite different. Institutional format, ward profile, individual traits and political 
context can all affect the work, authority and autonomy of councillors, shaping the 
nature of the job in many different ways. Despite these many variances, however, the 
fundamental ethos of the position remains the same: to represent citizens and their 
interests in local government. 
Councillors are the elected voice of their constituents, wards, and communities, 
and are above all else responsible for the advocacy for their interests in the local 
governance process. This responsibility involves not just relaying citizen concerns 
into the policy cycle, but ensuring the processes by which citizens are represented and 
power wielded is fair and inclusive. There are hence two fundamentally democratic 
principles, under which most councillor work can be categorised, that councillors can 
be expected to uphold: representation, and scrutiny (Snape and Dodds 2003; de Groot 
et al. 2010; Karlsson 2012; Heinelt 2013b; Copus 2017). These principles are the ends 
to which all councillor work is a means. In representation, councillors are responsible 
for the communication of constituent concerns, serving as a conduit between localities 
and local government. In scrutiny, councillors are tasked with holding the local 
executive to account, ensuring the oversight of council conduct, and scrutinising the 
passing of policy. 
Representation 
Representation (sometimes referred to as responsiveness), is a dynamic concept. 
Other than parliamentarians, councillors are in many instances the only 
representatives subject to independent, universal elections. This gives them the 
democratic legitimacy to act as advocates and leaders within the localities they 
represent. As a basic responsibility, representation involves the relaying of local 
interests and concerns to the council, so that these concerns may be reflected in policy 
and action. How councillors go about representing is changeable, however, based on 
factors such as a councillors’ political orientation (Heinelt 2013a: 649) and whether 
they see themselves as trustees or delegates. 
In an age-old political debate (see Eulau et al. 1959; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979; 
Mitchell 1997; Mansbridge 2011), trustees consider their primary role to be in the 
direct representation of their constituents’ interests via consultation and citizen 
interaction, while delegates see themselves more as appointed decision-makers on 
their constituents’ behalf. Trustees will typically spend more time consulting with 
citizens over their concerns and opinions regarding policy and local interests, while 
delegates will more often use their status as elected leaders to take decisions in line 
with what they believe is the best course of action. It is estimated that 57% of 
councillors across Europe consider themselves to be trustees, with the number rising 
to as high as 77% in Switzerland (Karlsson 2013a: 97). Evidently, most councillors 
view their democratic mandate as a duty to reflect the interests and concerns of their 
constituents in the political process, rather than a warrant to act as executive decision-
maker therefor. In a cross-national European study of councillors, Heinelt (2013b) 
notes that those orientated towards the right are more likely to adhere to the liberal 
democratic model of democracy and be comfortable with the trustee model of 
representation. 
A third way in which councillors perceive their representative role is that of party 
soldier, whereby councillors are not strictly acting as trustees or delegates, but rather 
place the will and interests of their respective political party as paramount. Verhelst et 
al. (2013), in a comparative study of European councillors, note the importance of 
parties in terms of providing initial motive for seeking election and providing support 
in doing so. Party soldiers tend to place emphasis on their party duties. In Europe they 
tend to be more orientated towards the left ideologically (Egner et al. 2016: 262). 
However, party soldiers tend to be significantly fewer than trustees or delegates 
overall, although it is worth considering that most councillors today are members of a 
political party and so their ‘party soldier’ duties may still be prevalent, even if they 
are not primary. 
Scrutiny 
Scrutiny then (sometimes referred to as accountability), can be understood broadly as 
the councillor’s responsibility to scrutinise policy design, critically oversee the 
implementation and delivery of services, and to hold the council and executive to 
account (Snape and Dodds 2003: 49). Like representation, this responsibility varies 
dependent on a number of factors, which we can neatly categorise as formal and 
informal. Formal factors generally pertain to local councillor responsibilities as 
outlined in local government acts (LGAs) and other council-specific legislation. 
LGAs tend to define the scrutiny responsibilities of councillors quite explicitly (see 
House of Commons 2013; Queensland Government 2016). These can be useful guides 
in explaining councillor roles and authority, outlining their duties of scrutiny and the 
jurisdiction thereof, and in settling intra-council disputes. 
These formal responsibilities are often somewhat open-ended, however, and can in 
some cases be undermined by informal factors such as a councillor’s position in or 
outside of the executive, seniority within the council, and relationships with other 
council members (Karlsson 2013a, 2013b). Research has shown that councillors can 
often find their de jure influence compromised in favour of the popular political clout 
of directly elected local mayors, for instance, as has been the case notably in recent 
years in Italy, Germany and Poland (Denters and Rose 2005; de Groot et al. 2010). 
Whether a councillor belongs to the party of the executive can also impact how 
effective they are in the policy cycle, and in overseeing the conduct of the executive 
and council as a whole. Councillors who are members of the executive can expect to 
have a greater input in the policy cycle than those who are not. Consequently 
however, they will also find themselves subject of greater behavioural and political 
scrutiny at the hands of non-executive members, whose sometimes-diminished role in 
the policy cycle is typically offset against heightened responsibility oversight of the 
executive and wider council conduct (as well as general opposition roles, such as 
public debate). 
Professionalisation 
One further consistency of the job of local councillor across examples and indeed 
time is the general trend toward professionalisation. How councillors go about 
upholding aforementioned principles and how seriously they do so has shifted 
considerably in recent decades. In virtually all states, being a councillor was once 
treated as a mostly voluntary vocation, with minimal attendance allowances paid to 
compensate councillors for their time commitment and very little formal training 
involved. Councillor responsibilities now, however, are typically outlined in LGAs, 
with formal training a necessity of the position in most countries and more generous 
remuneration provided. The time-series data on councillor working hours tend to 
suggest that over the decades councillors have committed to ever increasing hours 
(Kerley and McGarvey 2017). Although the amount of time dedicated to the role 
varies widely across examples – Scottish councillors work on average 35 hours per 
week, English 23 hours (Improvement and Development Agency 2010) compared 
with 87% of those in Belgium who work on average 30–60 hours per month, for 
instance (Verhelst et al. 2013b: 284) – the increasingly professional nature of the role 
is fairly constant. 
Councillor activities 
The increasingly professionalised responsibilities of a local councillor can thus vary 
based on myriad factors, including formal and informal differences, and whether a 
councillor views herself as a trustee, delegate, or party soldier. We know also that a 
councillor’s responsibilities to democracy involve the pursuit of two key principles: 
representation of constituents in the political process, and scrutiny of the policy cycle 
and indeed council conduct. But what is it that councillors actually do? Knowing that 
councillors have common base principles to uphold, what activities and roles do 
councillors undertake in doing so? Once more, these can vary across examples, 
although many basic elements of councillor work remain the same. We can thus 
classify councillor activities neatly under three broad headings: the councillor in 
public, the councillor in office, and the councillor in the party. 
In public 
As outlined in the previous section, councillors have traditionally acted as the voice of 
their constituents in the local governance process, fulfilling first and foremost the role 
of local representative for respective wards and communities. They are typically 
better educated than the generality of the population, and act as a conduit representing 
citizens to a large council bureaucracy. They are the link mechanism between 
communities and the council, and exist predominantly as the channel through which 
individual constituents can have some voice in council decision-making. Regardless 
of whether a councillor considers herself a trustee or delegate, most agree that this 
most elementary duty to represent constituents is of utmost importance (de Groot et 
al. 2010; Heinelt 2013). 
Representing constituents naturally requires communicating with constituents, 
which can take various forms. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, this has taken 
place historically in surgeries, with councillors in most countries employing some 
version thereof. Surgeries have over time been among the most visible aspects of 
councillors fulfilling their local representative role, and provide regular opportunity 
for constituents to meet with their councillor and raise complaints in person. 
However, there has been a long-term decline in surgery attendance by residents and 
consequently in surgery provision. Evidence from recent research suggests that even 
those councillors who still use surgeries find them a less meaningful and useful form 
of interaction with constituents than perhaps they were years ago (see Wilson and 
Game 2011; Kerley and McGarvey 2017), and observe that they are being utilised by 
a declining, ageing segment of their constituents. Surgeries now are thus as much a 
tool for public visibility as for raising concerns, allowing councillors to demonstrate 
their local presence, often without actually having to face a member of the public. 
Increasingly then, new information and communication technology is superseding 
face-to-face and other traditional forms of public interaction. Concerns are distinctly 
more likely to be raised via digital channels than in person, while many councillors 
are taking to social and new media to relay information back to the public. Outside of 
the United Kingdom, there have been broad initiatives to capitalise on this 
technological shift. Local councils in the likes of Sweden and the Netherlands, for 
example, made a point of pushing digital as a new and versatile means of councillor–
constituent communication (Karlsson 2012, 2013a). Even in countries where there no 
such initiatives have taken place, the transition away from ‘old school’ forms of 
councillor–constituent communication toward more modern means has occurred 
somewhat naturally in line with social and technological shifts. 
E-mail is now very much the dominant form of communication, both to and from 
councillors in most cases. Different social media are still somewhat less consistently 
employed by councillors, although the utilisation of blogs and online documentation 
of councillor time is becoming more prevalent. Those who use social media tend to 
view it as a tool to alert constituents to newsletters, invite them to events and make 
occasional political comments. Undoubtedly then, the diffusion of easy-to-use 
channels of communication has reshaped the interaction between councillor and 
constituent. In the past writing and posting a letter tend to demand time for reflection 
and thought. Today constituents can send petitions, e-mails and campaigning material 
instantaneously. They often expect a similarly speedy response. 
Beyond communicating with constituents over specific concerns, councillors 
undertake a variety of public activities. These may include participating in local 
hustings, attending community events and gatherings, mediating local political 
discussion and visiting local businesses (see Klok and Denters 2013 for a comparative 
review of the perceptions and actuality of councillor behaviour). This affords citizens 
further opportunity to interact with their councillors and raise local concerns, and in 
turn allowing councillors the chance to keep their finger on the local pulse. As with 
surgeries, however, many of these activities can serve as exercises in public visibility 
rather than integral council work, employed to bolster political popularity and future 
electoral prospects. Hustings will typically only take place today during election 
campaigns, while the heightened prominence of social media and instant reporting 
have made photo opportunities of councillors interacting with the public at local 
events all the more valuable. 
In the council 
The role of the councillor in public and the role of the councillor within the council 
are very porous and interrelated. In office, councillors must continue to represent 
constituents and relay their concerns to council meetings. Day-to-day council 
organisation may include ward casework based on constituent interaction, which in 
turn can become a topic for discussion in a committee or debate, for example. 
Likewise, the oversight and scrutiny of policy will generally be conducted in the 
interest of the councillor’s constituency. When we talk of councillor activities in the 
council, then, we refer to the formal duties carried out by councillors within 
specifically within local councils and on council business in the furthering of 
constituent interests, which we can understand as internal governance. 
Internal governance is a somewhat catch-all term referring to the activities that all 
councillors get involved in regarding the organisation of their council. It is any 
activity that involves debating, administration, formulating policy, approving and 
overseeing council business, or holding the executive to account. Bernard (2010), for 
example, talks of Czech councillors in small municipalities as ‘politicians, 
development workers and informal leaders’. Forms of this duty can range widely, 
from basic casework such as e-mailing constituents and local partners, to acting as 
council or committee leader. Other activities may include acting as a portfolio holder, 
serving on a committee or taking part in debates in council meetings. In the most 
basic sense then, internal activity refers to those duties undertaken by councillors on a 
day-to-day basis within the council. 
Different aspects of internal governance can precedence over others. Of the key 
internal governance activities conducted by councillors, policymaking naturally stands 
as significant. Councillors in the vast majority of cases will perform at least some role 
in the policy cycle. As a base responsibility, councillors generally find themselves 
attached to one or a few committees relative to specific policy areas. Within these 
committees, councillors collaborate, debate, scrutinise and formulate policy. This is a 
continuous cycle, with scrutiny and oversight present at virtually every stage: from 
conception, to implementation, to service delivery. Councillors are thus not only 
responsible for designing and passing policy, but for ensuring its effective 
implementation. 
The position of different councillors within the policy cycle can vary. Within local 
authorities as outlined in the previous section, the influence enjoyed by local 
councillors over policy can fluctuate dependent on factors such as whether the 
councillor is a member of the executive or governing party/coalition, how long the 
councillor has been a member of the council for, and so forth. Yet these factors do not 
dictate councillor authority in the policy cycle exclusively. To presume so would be to 
presume that influence over policy and council business is one-dimensional and 
restricted to directive capacity, which it evidently is not. For example, dissatisfied 
constituents will approach their local councillor, regardless of their status as an 
executive or non-executive member, should complaints arise regarding a policy or its 
delivery. Following directly from duties of representation, all councillors thus have a 
fundamental role to play in relaying public feedback into the scrutiny and policy 
process. 
More crucially, however, all councillors have a responsibility to provide scrutiny 
and oversight of the executive and council conduct, which presents another important 
element of internal governance. Over time, oversight of the executive and local 
government activity has become a councillor duty of markedly greater prominence 
(de Groot et al. 2010; Wollman 2012). While members of the executive, members of 
the governing party/coalition, or generally more senior members may boast greater 
directive influence – that is, influence to set agendas and with more obvious control 
over policy design – other members maintain substantial responsibility not just in 
policymaking, but in the scrutiny of conduct and performance of the executive and 
indeed the council overall. This can be achieved via oversight committees, inquiries 
and reviews, which are conducted typically by non-executive members. In this role, 
non-executive members have the authority to hold executive members to account, and 
to subsequently ensure the effective, efficient, transparent and representative 
execution of council business. 
In the party 
Beyond these two primary sets of roles, local councillors undertake various external 
activities. One of these which can be of significant important is that of party member. 
While independent candidate numbers remain high compared with national 
government, most local councils are dominated by one or a coalition of parties. 
Candidates often stand on party platforms, with party preferences influencing their 
behaviour once elected. In Spain, 88.2% of members cited that implementing their 
party programme was of great or upmost importance (Navarro and Sweeting 2013). In 
Denmark, it was found that party membership was the strongest indicator of a 
councillor’s spending preferences (Serritzlew 2003: 327). Many councillors thus 
clearly have some interest in advancing party policy at the local level, and partaking 
in party activity, which may involve things like constituency party meetings, 
canvassing, attending party conference and the like. 
It is worth considering briefly at this point what local party groups are, and what 
they mean to local democracy. Beyond spending and executive policy decisions, local 
party groups have a substantial role to play. Colin Copus flatteringly cites these 
groups as being the ‘critical determinants of the vibrancy and health of local 
democracy’ (Copus 2004: 57), despite there still being such a high number of 
independent local councillors. As with party politics at large, however, parties solve a 
collective action problem and allow groups of like-minded candidates to form 
coalitions and govern effectively. Parties increase the predictability and transparency 
of policy outcomes, and simplify choices for voters and help to aggregate political 
interests (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; White 2006; Kölln 2014). They also act as a 
structure through which councillors are recruited and trained, a proxy where citizens 
can observe debate (the ‘theatre of representation’ as Copus describes it), and provide 
informational cues to help constituents understand political positions. It is indeed 
difficult to imagine a functioning democratic polity without them. 
With these fundamental tasks as with national politics, then, parties are by now 
institutionally engrained in local government, with considerable implications for 
affiliated councillors. To the local councillor, being a member of a party means 
working with party colleagues in the pursuit of common goals, which requires a large 
degree of coordination with the local party group. Involvement with a political party 
can thus have significant bearing on the amount of time a councillor dedicates to their 
role, and the way in which that role is fulfilled. In Germany, Egner (2015: 184) found 
that party activity took up a substantial amount of councillor time; so much so that 
councillors who were also members of a party registered higher overall working hours 
than independent candidates. Party infrastructure can also be an invaluable asset to 
councillors in communicating with constituents, financing and campaigning, while 
strong party cohesion can help to advance party and indeed constituency interests. 
External to the council 
Ask a random member of the public what councillors do outside of council hours and 
they might conjure up an image of one cutting the ribbon on a new community centre, 
or switching on Christmas lights in the town centre. Out-with party and internal 
council activities, however, councillors are being asked to fulfil various other 
important roles, namely representing the council in bodies that involve other 
organisations in the public, commercial and voluntary sectors. Councillors have a part 
to play in public and private bodies in areas such as health, planning, community 
safety, transport and social care. Where councils have privatised services, engaged in 
inter-municipal co-operation, involved contractors in service provision, or established 
independent bodies for the purpose of oversight and scrutiny, councillors will often be 
tasked with liaising with and participating in boards and meetings. Recent local 
government literature has tended to emphasise that such activities are becoming a 
more pronounced part of council activity (see Stoker and Wilson 2004; Wilson and 
Game 2011; McGarvey 2012; Painter 2012). In such arrangements local councillors 
are merely one actor among many (Plüss and Kübler 2013: 203), albeit often one of 
few with democratic legitimacy credentials. 
These additional duties can also involve procurement and investment activity, such 
as meeting with developers and planning committees and securing contracts for the 
council area. We might define these as local economic activities. Managing the local 
political economy, especially in countries whereby local authorities are responsible 
for the raising of their own revenue as in France, or where funding has tightened over 
time as in the UK, can be an important councillor role, with effects ranging well 
beyond the local setting alone. Local initiatives are markedly crucial links in a much 
longer chain, with observable effects of local economic activity ranging from 
community regeneration to national employment and welfare performance to 
international investment (Cox 1995; Swyngedouw 1997; Wood 1998; Sellers 2002). 
Economic stimulation is by no means inextricably confined to national or 
international forums, and nor are local communities necessarily guaranteed to be fully 
served by generalised national economic policy. As such, councillors play an 
important role in managing the local economy, which can in turn have much more 
expansive effect. 
Councillor workload 
Knowing now the various duties and responsibilities councillors are expected to 
conduct, and the similarities in these duties evident across examples, it may intuitively 
seem like councillors everywhere fulfil similar roles that might take up similar 
amounts of time and effort. Across the literature the trend of professionalisation has 
been noted, while the base responsibilities over time have remained the same. Indeed, 
most councillors go about their duties via analogous means and so instinctively this 
makes sense. As flexible as the role itself, however, councillor workloads can vary 
substantially for a number of reasons, across examples and indeed within councils 
themselves. This remains a surprisingly under-researched area: while there have been 
studies documenting the evolution of councillor roles, few have dissected the 
underlying factors influencing workload pressure in any great depth. 
Within the limited research that exists, some interesting hypotheses have been 
made. Studies have attempted to show that factors such as deprivation, councillor–
electorate ward ratio, party affiliation and time served on the council can all influence 
councillor workloads to some degree. These relationships are often relatively weak, 
however, or too heavily caveated to prove generalisable. Ward deprivation, for 
example, is somewhat shaky in that boundaries change and many wards can have high 
workloads with relative affluence. There is also the issue that those suffering in 
deprivation tend to also be politically subdued. Accepting that councillor workloads 
are at least in part influenced by constituent communication, this hypothesis becomes 
questionable. 
Ward size and ratio 
Of the cited determinants of councillor workload, ward population and councillor–
electorate ratio are perhaps the most common. These factors, it is thought, influence 
councillor workload in that the more people a councillor ultimately represents, the 
more work they will have to do. This is of course an entirely reasonable hypothesis to 
make, with research such as that conducted by Rao (1994) seeming to provide support 
therefor. More recent studies, however, have brought the strength of this relationship 
into question. Kerley and McGarvey (2017) for example, in their study of councillor 
workloads in Scotland, find no statistically significant relationship between councillor 
workload and ward population or councillor–electorate ratio. Rather, it is found that 
councillor workload can vary within just as much as between Scottish councils (ibid.: 
48), exposing a fairly serious methodological issue hidden with the use of average 
councillor time as a comparative measure; that is, where averages are employed, they 
can inadvertently mask internal ward and individual councillor differences. 
Broad-brush comparisons of average councillor workloads should thus be viewed 
with some vigilance, although that is not to say that they are always uninformative. 
Numbers of councillors serving the same population can vary markedly – for example 
Boston, USA and Glasgow, UK have roughly the same populations (670,000 and 
620,000 respectively), Glasgow has 85 councillors, Boston has 13. In US council 
jurisdictions small numbers of aldermen/councillors in councils are common. Even 
accounting for the undoubted substantial differences in political culture, council 
statute and constitutions, representative–executive relationship such a stark difference 
in number has an inevitable consequence in terms of how councillors in each city see 
their role. 
When we take into account average councillor working hours in the United 
Kingdom compared with other local councils across Europe, for example, these ratios 
are quite obviously of some note. The average councillor–electorate ratio in the 
United Kingdom is approximately 1:2860, while the average hours worked range 
from 25 in England to 35 in Scotland per week. Contrast this with the average 1:400 
ratio in Germany to 30–60 hours per month, or even the 1:800 in Belgium (Wilson 
and Game 2011: 275) and electorate-councillor ratio appears to be very much an 
open-and-shut case. But what of the differences between individual councillors, which 
show no real consistency with macro considerations? We can hence explain the 
difference in average workload between the anomalous United Kingdom and the rest 
of Europe in this regard, but we cannot explain differences between UK wards, nor 
wards in other countries, or differences overall at the individual councillor level. 
The same is true when we consider councillor workloads longitudinally. Time-
series data on councillor working hours, particularly through the more extensive 
English studies (see Rao 1994; Purdam et al. 2008), suggests that councillors have 
committed to increasing hours over time. This has ranged from 52 hours per month in 
the 1960s to as high as 92 hours per month by the 2000s (Redcliffe-Maud 1969; 
Robinson 1977; Widdicombe 1986; Improvement and Development Agency 2010). 
From this we can surmise that councillors overall are expected to commit to bigger 
workloads today than in the past, but again this presents a very approximate reading 
of a far more nuanced reality. Again, despite steadily increasing averages, workloads 
still vary dramatically within councils, across wards and across countries (see Wilson 
and Game 2011; Karlsson 2012; Verhelst et al. 2013a, 2013b; Egner 2015). Country 
and ward averages are thus helpful in showing some macro trends, but can often 
conceal important information regarding internal ward and individual variance. 
Self-determination, partisanship and politics 
So – how do we get to the root of these individual differences? For this, the most 
reliable and consistent observation may simply be that ‘councillors themselves decide 
how much energy they put into the representation of their electorate’ (Wilson and 
Game 2011: 274); that is, despite party and council pressures and varying ward 
profiles, councillors retain a high degree of discretion and agency over their own 
working hours, both in absolute terms and in focus i.e. which matters they wish to 
prioritise and the roles they wish to ultimately play (see Glasgow City Council/MORI 
2004). This is an important point to emphasise. If councillors have the autonomy and 
capacity to self-determine their working hours, then institutional pressures such as the 
size of ward population, its sparsity, deprivation level and other demographic factors 
will have muted impact on hours worked. With that, personalised factors become 
distinctly more pressing. Political persuasion or personal belief may very well be 
more indicative of how much work someone conducts in their ward to combat 
deprivation, rather than the scale and existence of deprivation itself, for example. The 
predominance of males in council chambers across the globe becomes very relevant 
when one considers the differences in importance of policy areas between genders. 
Women councillors across Europe consistently place social, environmental and 
(unsurprisingly) equal representation issues above men (Egner et al. 2013: 261). 
In this more autonomous vein, other political factors can also have a strong impact 
on the nature and amount of work councillors choose to do (Thrasher et al. 2012: 1). 
From the previous section, we know that councillors tied to a party tend to have 
increased working hours overall than independent members. This is because they have 
extra party responsibilities to attend to, such as running the local party group, 
communicating and meeting with party colleagues, and campaigning in party 
colleague constituencies. But politics does not occur in a party vacuum. Extending 
this aspect further then, other political factors such as the level of electoral 
competition in a ward may also influence councillor workloads. Councillors in safe 
wards, under less immediate electoral pressure, may be less prone to generate higher 
workloads by responding to contact from citizens or enthusiastically seeking out 
potential sources of constituent grievance. On the other hand, councillors in highly 
contested and marginal seats may be inclined to increase their workload, particularly 
in the public eye, to demonstrate their dedication to constituents and bolster their re-
election prospects. 
Institutions, multi-level governance and parties 
We know now, then, that councillors have reasonable autonomy to determine the 
amount of work they do, and the ways in which that work is conducted. Yet there are 
other substantial, external factors which influence the role of the councillor on a more 
fundamental level; namely, the wider political and institutional contexts in which 
councillors operate. How a state chooses to organise its democratic and institutional 
structures can cause significant variance in the autonomy afforded to councillors, the 
funding they are likely to enjoy, the jurisdictional remit of their position and the 
formal power held in local councils to affect change. With this, the position of a 
councillor can differ markedly across examples. The ‘millefeuille’ multi-level system 
in France is bound to have serious implications for local councillor duties and remit 
compared with, say, the very direct central-local relationship in England or Scotland 
for instance. Thus, where councillors can determine their own workload to a large 
extent, they cannot dictate their relative position within a state’s institutional 
framework. 
Unitary v. federal institutions 
Of institutional factors likely to shape the role of the councillor, decentralisation is 
instinctively most obvious. The extent to which a state is unitary or federal can have 
considerable bearing on local powers, authority and responsibilities (Crepaz 1996; 
Lijphart 1999; McGann 2006; McGann and Latner 2013). Ranging from highly 
federalised systems as in Germany and the United States, convoluted multi-tier 
systems as in France and Switzerland, to more direct relationships as in England, the 
authority granted to local councils, the devolved powers they wield and the funding 
mechanisms the employ will all have stark impact on how councillors operate, the 
amount of work they undertake, the official responsibilities they fulfil, and the vitality 
thereof to the national political context (see Sharpe 1970; Crook 2003). 
A cursory glance across cases illustrates this variance well, although perhaps not 
immediately in line with what we might expect. For instance, under the French system 
of governance, typified by its numerous layers (national, regional, sub-regional, inter-
communal and communal), it would be reasonable to assume that the role of 
councillors at the smallest commune level would be minimal and jurisdictionally 
unclear. Compare this with the local government system in England, typified by a 
direct central–local government relationship and control over larger numbers of 
citizens, and we could justifiably presume that councillors in England would boast 
more robustly defined and indeed expansive authority. This is evidently not the case. 
Where French councillors perhaps have a somewhat smaller remit, the autonomy they 
have over that remit is arguably stronger than in England. French councillors have 
almost full control over their raising, spending and policy priorities, protected clearly 
in legislation, while those in England find themselves heavily dependent on decisions 
taken at Westminster (Stoker 1997; Rhodes 1997). Councillors in unitary systems, it 
would seem, tend to be of greater subservience to the centre overall. 
One explanation for this may be that, under complex federal systems, councils and 
councillors are protected from tyranny of national government. National government 
in these cases has less direct access and input into the affairs of the local council. 
Local government in Belgium, for example, is intricate and often adversarial – so 
much so that policy gridlock can become common, with local councils in many 
instances stifling central government programmes (Happaerts et al. 2012; Happaerts 
2015). Germany presents a similar case, in that strongly protected federal rights of 
Länder councils, often referred to as the principle of subsidiarity whereby it is held 
that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible and practical level, can cause 
fairly staunch embattlement over jurisdiction, responsibility and policy 
implementation (Kraemer and Schreurs 2007: 7). 
We might view this capacity to resist national government as testament to the 
strong legal respect for local authority and the democratic legitimacy of the local 
councillor in such systems. Compare this with a unitary state such as England or 
Finland and we see stark differences. In these mostly unitary systems, a vast majority 
of power is retained at the centre (Kettunen 2007: 43), with national government 
reserving the capacity to redefine local council authority and restrict funding should 
local councils refuse to play ball. In Italy, the constitution allows the national 
government to pre-empt local councils where they are seen to be failing to perform or 
meet obligations (Vesperini 2009: 9). Here, gridlock is palpably less common, since 
central government can adapt the rules of the game to suit their own agenda with 
relative impunity. Strong federalism can thus provide a safeguard for councillors and 
their authority from central government, ultimately lending more gravitas to the 
position itself. 
Yet federalism is not always so positive, particularly in cases where political and 
judicial oversight is found to be lacking. Until now this chapter has been largely 
concerned with examples from Western systems, reflecting what is often a lack of 
scope in the literature itself. Venturing further afield, however, the experience of local 
government and the position of the local councillor in places such as India and across 
sub-Saharan Africa can be quite different (Crook 2003; Singh 2004; Cali and Sen 
2011). Often in these areas there exists a local political culture of clientelism, where 
patronage and emphasis on social order is more evident. 
In some states, convoluted multi-tier governance provides a perfect arena for 
corruption, patronage, and exploitation. Often this is down to weak scrutiny capacity 
and political institutions overall allowing unsavoury activity to fester and blossom 
(North 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Councillors can become compromised 
(or captured, to borrow a term from public administration) by corrupt interests. Often 
they are already members of these interest networks prior to election. They thus cease 
to fit the traditional representative roles of trustee, delegate or party soldier, instead 
serving as what we might consider a purveyor of interests for dominant economic, 
social, and political classes, protected from repercussion by weak institutions and 
deep-rooted political culture. 
Party executives and national government 
Multi-level governance is not the only extra-local force with bearing on councillor 
roles. Party political matters can also be of some significance. We know from 
previous sections that being a member of a party can increase councillor workload 
and influence how a councillor behaves in government, while being a party soldier 
can lead to them being almost entirely subservient to a party machine – yet we have 
so far only covered the party locally, with little consideration for the party as a 
national entity controlled by a central executive. At this level, parties shape councillor 
roles in other ways. Party constitutions, operating practices and culture tend to be 
designed to induce discipline among elected representatives, councillors included. 
Being a member of a party, particularly mass parties wherein decision-making is 
highly centralised (Kirchheimer 1966; Krouwel 2006), will thus have distinct bearing 
on the autonomy a councillor has not just over policy matters and voting preferences, 
but over the duties they are expected to fulfil. Party leadership may identify executive 
and committee roles for councillors, or seek move their voting behaviour and debate 
contributions in line with their own national priorities. Furthermore, they may 
encourage councillors to spend more time on activities such as local canvassing and 
campaigning. 
Another, less direct party-related factor which may impact councillor roles and 
workload is which party or coalition holds power in national government. In the 
United Kingdom during the 1980s, for instance, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
government was very much in the business of privatising and reducing the 
responsibility of local councils (see Bulpitt 1989; Buller 1999). With such support for 
privatisation, typical of conservative parties and not exclusive to the United Kingdom 
(see for example Bel et al. 2007; Warner and Hebdon 2001), it follows logically that 
councillors might find themselves with reduced authority and workload. Accepting 
that conservative parties tend towards privatisation of services and smaller 
government while social democratic and socialist governments tend towards increased 
nationalisation and local service provision (see Hicks and Swank 1992), we could 
hence surmise that the role and workload of the councillor is directly impacted by 
which party or coalition sits in national government. 
Conclusions 
The role of the councillor is hence a flexible and multifarious concept. From this 
chapter, we know the basic responsibilities councillors hold, the roles they play, and 
the factors which shape the nature, intensity and authority thereof. Where councillors 
have various duties in the public, in the council, in the party and indeed elsewhere, 
matters such as formal responsibilities as outlined in LGAs, their position within the 
local government and the institutional context under which they operate can all impact 
the role and work of councillors across examples. We understand also the ways in 
which councillors perceive themselves, and the different drivers and incentives of 
councillor behaviour. 
Councillors today see themselves predominantly as trustees, relaying and 
representing the will of their local interests and constituents. It is worth taking a 
moment to reflect on why this is significant. In the modern world, cynical assertions 
are often made regarding the diminishing role and autonomy of the councillor and 
local politics under forces of economic and political globalisation. It is clear, 
however, that under such forces, the primary democratic roles fulfilled by local 
councillors provide a vital link between citizens and power, without which democracy 
overall would be fundamentally weakened. Under such forces – arguably even in spite 
of them – councillors remain the most direct link to localities and citizens, who might 
otherwise find themselves marginalised in favour of higher political and economic 
dealings. The part played by local councillors in representing local, citizen and 
community interests is thus integral to the political process, and fills an essential need 
that cannot be achieved by distant central or international governance alone. It is little 
exaggeration to suggest that councillors, as locally elected representatives, are one of 
the key building blocks on which democracy is based. 
Of course, despite this increasing and fundamental importance, the role of local 
councillors and local politics overall, often still finds itself sidelined by academics in 
favour of apparently more significant research areas in field such as global 
governance and international relations. As such, in the existing literature, there are 
various questions that remain unanswered, unconvincingly answered or answered in 
one jurisdiction only. These questions serve as promising avenues for further cross 
national study. These include, but are by no means restricted to: the impact of central 
party and partisanship on the local councillor; the role of the councillor in the local 
economy; the impact of institutions (e.g. elected mayors) on councillor roles and 
responsibility (i.e. how different institutional structures impact councillor authority 
and work at local, national and international levels); councillor roles in new networks 
of focused on service provision; councillors and new media; and councillor workload 
and role studies beyond the British and European norm. There are hence myriad 
questions to ask and answer for scholars not just of local politics, but of political 
parties, democracy and institutions, political economy, globalisation, sociology and 
beyond. Given the heightened significance of local councillors today, this is perhaps a 
more important pursuit than ever. 
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